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Introduction
The voluntary administration I procedure is a temporary one in the life of
a company. It is a means to an end. That end is represented in the
outcomes of the process. Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act provides that
there will be three possible outcomes from the administration. They are
liquidation, the entering into a deed of company arrangement or a return
of the company to its pre-administration situation.2 Voluntary
administration is ultimately a means by which the insolvent corporate
entity may get to a position where a plan of reconstruction or
reorganisation will be put in place or the company will enter liquidation.3
In addition the court may terminate the administration in certain
circumstances.4 These o~tcomes are worthy of a study in themselves but
it is beyond the scope of this article to deal with these other forms of
administration in detail. The focus of this article is the transition to these
other stages in the life of the insolvent company. It is argued that this
transition is a positive feature of the overall Part 5.3A processes but that
there are some gaps in the legislation that require consideration in the
evaluation of Part 5.3A.
• Department of Law, University of Southern Queensland. The author thanks Dr Keith
Fletcher of the University of Queensland for his helpful comments on this article but
errors remain those of the author.
Under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 200/ (Cth). All sections mentioned in the
article are to this Act unless noted otheJWise.
Section 439C and s 435C(2). It is not intended here to consider the final alternative
mentioned in s 439C. This is because it does not create any issue and importantly the
outcome is rarely chosen.
Again ignoring the final alternative in s 439C.
See s 435C. As this article is focused upon the voluntary administration process the
outcomes are dealt with briefly as they are a separate set of procedures to those which
operate in a voluntary administration.
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In one sense the outcomes of the voluntary administration might be seen
in the objectives for Part 5.3A.5 These enunciate that the objects are to
save as much of the business as possible and if that is not feasible to gain
a better return to creditors than would have been available in an
immediate winding up. It is however the specific results that are measured
against these criteria rather than the voluntary administration itself. Too
much emphasis on the procedure leading to the outcomes may detract
from an examination of the outcomes themselves. Accordingly, it is
necessary to examine the transition to determine how well the process of
voluntary administration facilitates the achievement of the objectives.
This article will cover issues that relate to the transition to the deed of
company arrangement and the winding up of the company following
voluntary administration. In so doing it is demonstrated that the transition
to these other insolvency regimes is less regulated and less clear than the
relatively methodical legislative regime for the administration itself. It is
shown that the lack of legislative direction has resulted in the courts
attempting to fill in the gaps. It is suggested that this does not always
result in the best solution. These matters are subsequently related to
theory about the voluntary administration process based on the economics
and law paradigm.~ The article makes several suggestions for law reform
in these areas.'
The intention of the Harmer Report as regards outcomes of
the administration
The General Insolvency Inquiry (the Harmer Report) was concerned that
the approach to insolvency be constructive' in the sense that the
possibility of saving a business is focused upon and that a procedure
'encourage and offer a reasonable prospect .of achieving that result'.8 It
went on to state generally that the meeting of creditors should offer
creditors the option of resolving that the company is to be wound up or
accept a deed of company arrangement or simply cease to be under
administration.9 It is interesting to note that the recommendation for the
winding up of the company was that the company would be wound up if
5 Section 435A.
6 This article does not attempt to deal comprehensively with all of the issues that arise in
the context of a company under a deed of company arrangement just as it does not deal
with liquidation in any detail.
, Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No. 45
(1988) [52]-[53].
8 Ibid [53].
9 Ibid [56].
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such were the resolution of the creditors 'as if an order of the court to that
effect had been made on the day that the company became a company
under administration'.lO This suggests that the Harmer Report
contemplated the winding up to be a court ordered winding up,
presumably in insolvency under Part 5.4, rather than the provisions of a
creditors' voluntary winding up under Part 5.5. In relation to the deed of
company arrangement, the Harmer Report stated that:
If a deed of company arrangement is agreed, it will be a simplified
document of much less size and complexity than the present forms of
'scheme documents' that oppress creditors and others. The .deed will
incorporate (by simple reference) standard provisions contained in a
schedule to the companies legislation, as well as many provisions of the
legislation dealing with, for example, admissible claims, order of
distribution to creditors and avoidance of antecedent transactions (such as
preferences and similar voidable transactions).11
This contains a curious reference to the fact that the 'scheme documents'
as they then existed 'oppress creditors and others'. It is not entirely clear
what is meant by the term 'oppress' in this context. Oppression is a term
used in the Corporations Act when dealing with shareholder remedies. 12
It is generally associated with a notion of gross unfairness in the exercise
of a majority power. 13 The mere fact that a document is lengthy and
complex does not cause it to be oppressive in this sense. The word
'oppressive' is therefore more likely to have been used in a general sense
merely to emphasise the need for a simple document. If that was the aim
it is not clear that it has been achieved. The complexity of a business and
its financial structure is likely to determine the level of complexity of the
deed. There is a degree of flexibility in the provisions in Part 5.3A in
relation to the content of the deed but this should not be assumed to
equate with simplicity. Nor is there an apparent reason as to why
simplicity should be an overriding goal. The aim of the legislation is to
maximise the chances of the company surviving, or failing that, getting
·10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Now contained in Part 2F.1.
13 Examples given in relation to Part 2F.1 are illustrated in H Ford, R Austin, and I
Ramsay, Ford's Principles OfCorporations Law (2000) [11.440]:
Acts such as: abuse of voting power by the majority in altering the constitution;
improperly condoning a wrong done to the company; or an abuse of power by the
directors (such as an improper issue of shares), are redressable on the application of a
member.
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better returns to creditors.14 It is not appropriate that simplicity should be
a reason to liquidate rather than enter into a deed.
The Harmer Report did not provide much detail regarding the manner in
which a deed may be drawn up. It referred to the 'professional
investigation' that would precede the report by the administrator and that,
if it were proposed that a deed be entered into, a statement of the
particulars of the proposed arrangement should be given. IS The Report
went on to detail some aspects of the deed procedure. For example, it
stated that the creditors appoint the administrator of the deed who need
not be the administrator under the voluntary administration. Therefore the
'creditors exercise control, not only by their collective power to accept or
reject a proposal for an arrangement but also by their right to appoint the
administrator of the deed' .16 In implementing these recommendations in
the legislation it was stated that:
One of the most common results of the administration process will be that
the company and its creditors will enter into a 'deed of company
arrangement'. The contents of this deed will vary according to the need of
the particular company and its creditors, though it might often be expected
to provide for some form of compromise of debts, such as repayment of'
debts by del~yed instalments. In exchange, the activities of company
management might be subjected to supervision by the creditors. The new
Part 5.3A does not seek to limit in any way the scope for a company and its
creditors to reach an arrangement suitable to all parties.J7
This passage suggests the deed will be a common outcome of the
administration. It has not been the case however that it is the most
frequent outcome of administration. It would seem from the limited
amount of available datal8 that the most common outcome of the
14 Section 435A.
IS ALRC, General Insolvency Inquiry above n 7 [I 10].
16 Ibid [115].
17 Explanatory Memorandum to Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 Australian
Government Printing Service.
18 See for example Australian Securities Commission ASC Research Paper 98/01 (1998),
Appendix II [5.3]. It states there that:
Data lodged with the Australian Securities Commission indicates that there have
been 5,760 companies between 23 June 1993 and 30 June 1997, which have entered
into Voluntary Administration....Ofthese companies 2,162 (or 38%) have proceeded
to a Deed of Company Arrangement (DCA), 3,080 (or 53%) went straight into
liquidation, 37 companies appear to have resumed normal trading without entering
into a DCA (Pathway 1), 23 companies were immediately deregistered and 458 (or
8%) remain under administration.
It may be noted that a much smaller survey in the initial year of operation of Part 5.3A
showed that 50.3% of voluntary administrations ended in a deed of company
arrangement: S Coad, 'The Australian Society of CPA's Survey of the First Year of
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administration process is liquidation. Again the intention of the
legislature was that flexibility be available in relation to what form that
the deed will take. As explained below it is possible that in seeking to
leave the deed to be as flexible as possible, the legislation may have
failed to provide sufficient clarity as to how it may operate.
The Legal Issues surrounding the Deed
There are a large number of matters that have arisen in relation to the
deed of company arrangement. It must first be recognised that when the
deed comes into effect the administration of the company ce-ases.19 This
creates a number of changes to the rights of the various company
stakeholders during the administration. These include:
• most of the powers of the administrator in the administration do not
automatically pass on to the administrator of the deed20 with control
of the company reverting to those who controlled the company before
the administration commenced unless there were changes during the
administration or there are specific provision in the deed;
• the administrator of the deed does not automatically receive any
indemnity in relation to debts incurred unlike the administrator in the
administration;21 and.
• the secured creditors, owners of property in the possession of the
company22 and a creditor of the company who has a guarantee with
respect to their debt from directors23 may all enforce their respective
rights subject to certain limitations.24
Voluntary Administrations' in J Lessing and J Corkery (eds) Corporate Insolvency
Law (1995) 54. The ASC data is more comprehensive and does not rely on swvey
responses.
19 Section 435C.
20 Examples include the powers given in Division 3 of Part 5.3A to exclusively control
the company and its business, to deal exclusively with the company's property, to act
as the company's agent. The powers of the officers of the company are only suspended
during the administration. See also the discussion in relation to liquidation being
revived when an administration ends in Mercy & Sons Pty Ltd v Wanari Pty Ltd
(2000) 157 FLR 107.
21 Under Division 9 of Part 5.3A the administrator under an administration has rights to
be indemnified out of the assets of the company as well as being personally liable for
the debts incurred. .
22 Section 444D.
23 M & G Oyster Supplies Pty Ltdv Noncbalant Pty Ltd (1995) 19 ACSR 27.
24 In the case of secured creditors and owners or lessors of property, an administrator
(either under the administration or the deed administrator) may apply under s 444F for
an order of the court to limit the rights to enforce the security or take possession of the
property.
19
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Therefore the manner of the change from voluntary administration to
operations under a deed is important because the failure to effect such a
change properly can have disastrous consequences for any rescue bid.2s
The legislation is vague in its references to the development of the deed.
For example, there is no specific reference as to the position if a company
were already in liquidation at the time that a deed was approved. This
arises in the situation where a liquidator appointed an administrator under
s 436B. In such cases it has been held that a court ordered liquidation is
not terminated by the entering into a deed26 but further that the creditors
may not cause the company to enter into a voluntary winding up either.
The position where a company is in voluntary liquidation prior to the
administration appears to be similar.27 This interpretation of the
legislation raises questions as to what creditors may decide at the second
meeting. Presumably they may terminate the administration and therefore
resume the court ordered or voluntary winding up, or they may choose a
deed of company arrangement. If the latter is chosen but the winding up
continues the effect of the deed is unclear. It appears from the Mercy &
Sons28 case that the court retains its power to set aside the deed though
upon what basis it should do so seems uncertain.
Who proposes the deed?
The legislation outlines the deed in s 444A. That section makes it clear
that the administrator in the voluntary administration will be the
administrator of the deed unless the creditors resolve to appoint someone
else. It seems likely that the creditors will not often change administrators
given their knowledge of the company and the document that has been
developed. However it is clear that the administrator of the deed must
prepare the instrument that sets out the terms.ofthe deed.29 This does not
explain who should develop the rescue proposal. In contrast, the
Bankruptcy Code 1978 (US) states clearly that only the debtor may
propose a plan for the first 120 days after the filing for protection under
Chapter 1po Under the Australian provisions, there is implicitly a
different approach. It is implicit because nowhere does the legislation
state specifically that the responsibility for developing a plan rests with
2S To some extent this is ameliorated by the ability to apply under s 447A. See
Australasian Memory Pty Ltd v Brien (2000) 200 CLR 270.
26 Mercy & Sons Pty Ltd v Wanari Pty Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 70.
27 Re Narde/l Coal Pty Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 110.
28 Mercy & Sons Pty Ltd v Wanari Pty Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 70.
29 s 444A(3).
30 Unless a trustee is appointed: see Bankruptcy Code 1978 (US) s 1121.
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the administrator. Under s 438A, the administrator in a voluntary
administration has the obligation to investigate the company's property,
business and financial circumstances and form an opinion about each of
the matters that must be decided by the creditors at the second meeting
under s 439A. Specifically, this includes an opinion as to whether it
would be in the interests of the company's creditors for the company to
execute a deed of company arrangement. These opinions must then be
communicated to the creditors by way of a report prior to the meeting.3) It
does not state who may develop the plan or whether it is possible for
there to be comment on more than one plan. It is likely, that in the
Australian context there is such a short period in which to propose a deed
that the chances of more than one serious rescue plan being developed are
low. This can be seen as a possible limitation on the procedure. The limits
of the US approach have been also recognised:
The debtor's exclusive right under § 1121 to propose a plan for the first 120
days of the Chapter 11 case and to obtain acceptance of it within an
additional 60 days, together with the court's discretionary authority to grant
extensions of those periods under § 1121(d) is of great strategic importance
to the debtor in its plan negotiations. So long as exclusivity remains intact,
time is on the side of the debtor. If the exclusivity periods are extended over
a substantial period of ,time, creditors may feel compelled to accept an
unfavourable plan of the debtor when, absent exclusivity, they might have
been able to propose their own plan-one more favourable to their interests.32
The Australian approach has an advantage compared to the US system
because the administrator is in a position to represent the creditors'
interests and seek a 'better' plan if the debtor proposes something that is
inadequate. In addition, the shorter period in Australia is likely to mean
there will not be pressure to accept something unfavourable simply to get
a prompt payment of some amount. However, the Australian approach
has the possible flaw of having, in most cases, too short a period to allow
for the development of a deed by anyone other than the debtor (albeit that
it is done through the administrator).
How much of the deed is available to creditors before they approve
it?
The deed .is the outcome of negotiation and often compromise amongst
the creditors and other stakeholders in the company. This has raised
questions in some instances as to whether the deed accurately reflects the
bargain that creditors believed they were voting for. This arises because
3) Under s 439A(4).
32 W Warren and D Bussel, Bankruptcy (61h ed, 2002) 646.
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there is no requirement that the complete deed be put to the creditors at
the meeting under s 439A. Under the current legislation the requirement
is only that an administrator circulates before the second meeting of
creditors 'a statement setting out details of the proposed deed' .33 It has
been held that this does not require a complete deed to be forwarded to
creditors.34 It is not clear how closely the details of the final deed must
mirror this statement. This issue has been a source of criticism of the
procedure;3s it is a possibility that creditors believe they are agreeing to
one arrangement but find that the deed reflects something quite different.
The precise obligation of the administrator in relation to what must be put
forward to creditors remains something for judicial consideration. There
is little case law reflecting this issue despite the apparent concern
discussed in various reports.36 Creditors who are dissatisfied with the
deed as it is drawn up have two avenues of remedy. First it would be
possible to apply to the court to have the deed set aside under s 4450.37
An alternative is to require the administrator to call a meeting of creditors
under s 445F to consider a variation of the deed. Each of these could be
costly for the creditor. What this reflects is a general lack of specification
in the legislation about the deed when a company seeks that alternative.
Whilst flexible approaches are generally desirable in this area, they must
be undertaken within a framework that provides some certainty as to how
the practical steps should progress.
The Corporate Voluntary Administration Final Report discussed the need
to have the deed reflect creditor wishes in some detail38 but rejected the
33 Section 439A(4)(c).
34 Deputy Commissioner oj Taxation (Cth) v Comcorp Australia Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC
1671 and on appeal (1996) 21 ACSR 590. However see also M &S Butler Investments
Ltd v Granny May's Franchising (1997) 24 ACSR 695 where it was made clear that
the administrator must make material details available to creditors.
3S See Australian Securities Commission, ASC Research Paper 98101 (1998) [2.112] and
[7.305]; Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee,
Corporate Voluntary Administration Final Report (1998) [2.98] to [2.112];
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of
Australia, Improving Australia's Corporate Insolvency Laws: Issues Paper (2003)
[1.135] accessed available:
<www.aph.gov.au/senatelcommittee/corporations_cttelail/issuespaper.doc>.
36 As noted in the footnote above. The matter was raised but not discussed in In the
Matter ojTony Michael Mechanical PIL (under administration) [2003] QSC 141. The
issue that arose in this case was in relation to the date specified in the deed before
which claims must have arisen in order to be bound.
37 Specifically under s 4450(1)(a) or (b) on the basis that information that was provided
to creditors was false or misleading or that there was a material omission from a report
or statement.
38 Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee Corporate
Voluntary Administration Final Report (1998) [2.98 to 2.112].
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proposal that administrators be required to table a copy of a draft deed at
the meeting and make it available for inspection. This was rejected on the
basis that it may not be settled at that time and it may be subject to change
by the meeting anyway. Instead it was suggested that the legislation
should provide for two situations.39 Where a draft deed is approved at the
second meeting of creditors, it was considered that the legislation should
require execution by the company within 15 days of approval unless
extended by the court.40 Where the deed in draft form was prepared after
the second meeting, the administrator need prepare the deed within 10
business days of the meeting. Creditors would then have thr~e business
days to inspect the deed. Then the company and the administrator should
execute the deed within a further two days after the end of the inspection
period. The court would have the power to extend these periods.41 This
approach goes some way to addressing the issue, as creditors would be
able to inspect the deed before it is executed and they are put on notice
about the prospect of variation from the draft documents that appear at
the meeting. This also shortens the period in which the document must be
prepared and executed. This of itself may assist by way of enabling
creditors to act more quickly where there is a problem with the deed.42
Nevertheless the underlying problem will remain as long as the
administrator is not required to produce the deed prior to the meeting.
The nature of the process with such a short period of administration may
not enable the preparation of a deed and it is a difficulty which must be
recognised as a trade-off for creditors being able to move on to a
subsequent phase for the company. Given that the deed must be executed
within 21 days of the vote43 a possible reform would be the option to
adjourn the meeting where the deed cannot be produced.44 Some
allowance could be made for situations where the meeting alters the
proposed deed in the manner described by the CASAC Report. Under the
current provisions, it is possible for the period in which to execute the
39 Ibid [2.100].
40 Ibid [2.101].
41-Ibid [2.112].
42 Delay is generally taken into account by the court in deciding whether to exercise its
diScretion under s 445D and set aside a deed for one of the reasons set out there:
Khoury v Zambena Pry Lld (1997) 23 ACSR 344.
43 See s 444B.
44 Although this is possible now under the general power to extend the relevant periods
by way of an application to the court under s 439A(6) or by adjourning the meeting
under s 439A(2), a specific section could entitle the administrator to extend the
convening period by another 14 days where a deed will be proposed but is unable to be
presented.
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deed to be extended.4s It has been stated that the approach of the court
where such an application is made is to balance the possible advantages
of the deed against the consequences if the deed is not executed and the
company is automatically placed in liquidation.46 It makes much more
sense to enable the extension to be granted prior to the vote of creditors.
What type of a document is the deed?
The development of the deed is one factor but the need to establish the
nature of the deed once it comes into effect has also been an important
issue in the courts. The nature of the 'deed' has been examined in a
number of different contexts. Importantly in MYT Engineering Ply Ltd v
Mulcon Ply Ltd,47 the majority of the High Court were of the view that a
deed of company arrangement did not require execution as a deed.48 The
majority stated that:
The use of the tenn 'deed of company arrangement' can be explained as an
allusion to the earlier fonns of arrangement made, on the insolvency of
individuals, by deed of arrangement. Those instruments have long been
called 'deeds ofarrangement', but they have not always been made by deed.
The nineteenth century United Kingdom statutes that provided for their
registration m~e- plain that the instruments to be registered were
instruments that affected any of several kinds ofarrangement with creditors,
whether or not the instrument concerned was under sea1.49
This of itself is significant, but perhaps of more interest is the
consideration of the nature of the arrangement and how this may affect its
operation. The majority went on to explain that the assent of the company
was of critical importance in the creation of a binding plan:
A company can make a deed of company arrangement only while it is in
administration. By requiring that 'the comp~y' execute the instrument,
which upon execution by both the company and the administrator becomes a
deed of company arrangement, Pt S.3A requires a visible expression of the
company's assent to the tenns that are recorded in the instrument. Further,
by providing that the instrument becomes a deed of company arrangement
4S See s 444B(2).
46 Sydney Ringtread Tyres Ply Ltd (administrator appointed) (2001) 38 ACSR 221;
Cvitanovic v Jol/y Roger Exports Ply Ltd [2003] NSWSC 729.
47 (1999) 195 CLR 636; 30 ACSR 705.
48 It should be noted that Kirby J was of the view that the legislation required execution
as a deed. This view was based on a number of factors including the use of the word
deed in both the legislation and the Harmer Report, the manner in which it operates,
and the various provisions relating to it that are consistent with the document being a
deed: MYT Engineering Ply Ltd v Mu/con Ply Ltd [1999] HCA 34 [43] to [52].
49 [1999] HCA 34 (Gleeson Cl, Gaudron, Gurnrnow and Hayne JJ) [13].
- --------------------------------------------,
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when executed by both the company and the administrator, the legislation
reveals an intention that the company's transition from being subject to
administration to being subject to a deed of company arrangement should
not depend exclusively on the wish of the creditors and the assent of the
administrator. And indeed the provision in s 446A (1) (b) for what is to
happen if the company contravenes s 444B (2) and does not execute the
instrument within time (coupled with the explicit reference to this
consequence in s 444B (7» can only reinforce that conclusion.so
Whilst this may follow from the provisions as analysed by the Court, it is
unclear why such consent is necessary. The company at that stage is
under the complete control of the administrator by virtue of s' 437A, thus
to suggest that there is any real consent by the company is artificial
because in practical terms it is largely a different entity. The shareholders
play no part in the decision making process as to the acceptance of the
deed. The officers of the company have no power at that stage due to the
operation of s 437C and hence the 'company' can be only those with the
residual interest, essentially the creditors. They are the ones who have
approved the deed. The administrator is also required to execute the deed,
so it is curious that the company need execute it at all. Further, if the
consent is to be considered anything more than a formality it is difficult to
see in what circumstance~ the company could withhold its 'consent' if the
creditors approved the deed and the administrator had executed it.
The fact that the company is required to 'consent' to the deed does
emphasise the contractual nature of the deed, however as the passage
below indicates, it is the legislation that binds the creditors as well.SI
It may be, however, that the deed of company arrangement is not simply a
contract. No doubt a deed of company arrangement will contain
stipulations and promises of a kind found in contracts between parties.
But a deed of company arrangement is more than a set of promises
between those who are parties to it (the only essential parties to a deed of
company arrangement are the company and the deed administrator.) First,
it is a document that, on execution, effects a change in status of the
company, from a company under administration to a company subject to a
deed of company arrangement. Secondly, it is a document that contains
50 MYT Engineering Pty Lld v Mu/con Pty Lld [1999] HCA 34 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
Gummow and Hayne JJ) [18].
51 MYT Engineering Pty Lld v Mu/con Pty Lld [1999] HCA 34 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
Gummow and Hayne JJ) [25]. This nature of the deed as a contract was also
-acknowledged in Derwinto v Lewis [2002] NSWSC 731 [42] where Austin J speaking
of a deed stated that it 'binds creditors, the company and the administrators in contract,
tothe extent that they are parties to it, and by statutory extensions of the contract under
ss 4440 and 444G'.
" ..
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tenns that bind all creditors of the company 'so far as concerns claims
arising on or before the day specified in the deed under paragraph
444A(4)(i)'. Those obligations stem from the combined operation of the
deed of company arrangement and the law, not from any contractual
bargain between the persons bound, and are imposed on all creditors, not
just those who voted in favour of any composition or moratorium
reflected in the deed ofcompany arrangement.
It is difficult to accept why the binding nature of the deed should be seen
as contractual in the sense of persons being legally bound by an
agreement, given that the persons bound are bound because of the
legislation and irrespective of their agreement.52
The reference to the contractual nature of the deed in MYT Engineering53
has resulted in some difficulties. In Surber v Lean,54 the court stated that
the administrator must grant his or her consent for any variation in a deed
where such variation was approved by the creditors. This presents the
administrator with a power of veto over the decisions of the creditors.
This does not reflect the underlying nature of the scheme in Part 5.3A. It
is for the creditors to decide their own fate in tenns of the deed. Clearly
the administrator should have the power to approach the court but this is
something less than what was granted to the administrator in this case. It
has been suggested55 that because of the contractual nature of the deed, it
may not restrict rights of appeal. In Derwinto v Lewis, Austin J stated:
In my view the correct construction of these provisions is that the statutory
right of appeal under s 1321 cannot be restricted by a provision of the deed.
Section 444D, according to which creditors are bound by the deed, must be
read subject to other provisions of the Act. The Court ought not to adopt a
52 See here also Sutherland v Rahme Enterprises [2003] NSWSC 673 [13] where Barrett
J comments that:
Under s 4440 of the Corporations Act, a deed of company arrangement binds all
creditors so far as concerns claims arising on or before the day specified in the deed
pursuant to s 444A (4) (i), in this case 19 December 2002. Under s 444G, a deed of
company arrangement also binds the company, its officers and members and the
deed's administrator. The deed's binding force, as regards all such persons, is wholly
statutory and derives from the two acts of execution which, by s 4448 (6), cause a
particular instrument to be a deed of company arrangement. These matters are
discussed and confirmed in the High Court's decision in MYT Engineering Pty Ltd v
Mu/con Pty Lld (1999) 195 CLR 636. The binding force of a deed of company
arrangement, being wholly statutory, is therefore ofconceptually the same kind as the
binding force of a scheme of arrangement under s 411.
53 MYTEngineering Pty Ltd v Mulcon Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 34.
54 (2000) 36 ACSR 176.
55 Ford, Austin and Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law above n 13 [26
270].
- --- --- -------------------------------------------
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construction that would pennit a right of appeal to be restricted, unless the
relevant provisions are clearly intended to have that effect.56
It is not obvious why this issue should be regarded as following from the
contractual nature of the deed. Surely it is as a result of the deed being
part of a statutory scheme. So in reading the statute as a whole there is no
basis for allowing one part to be read as limiting another provision
without explicit wording indicating that that is so.
Therefore, as a result of the MYT Engineering decision, the deed is seen
as a document under which the parties are bound because of their
agreement or if they do not agree are bound because 'of statutory
provisions. This seems a rather unnecessary complication in respect of the
procedure. Whether an unsecured creditor agrees or does not agree to the
deed is essentially irrelevant once the deed has been approved in
accordance with the legislative requirements.5' In the case of a secured
creditor or owner or lessor of property, they will bound only if they vote
in favour of the deed or the court orders them to be so bound.58 These can
be seen simply as the impact of statutory provisions giving effect to the
statutory scheme without the results that emphasising the contractual
nature, of the deed brings. Where a person has guaranteed a debt of the
company and the company has entered into a deed of company
arrangement, it will generally be the case59 that the guarantor is liable
under the guarantee. Thus, in relation to the impact of the deed on a
guarantee it has been said that:
The scheme (sic) of arrangement prevented the respondent from exercising
the procedural rights stipulated in [the deed], save that legal proceedings and
enforcement process could still be brought with leave of the court. But it did
not render debts that had become due and payable no longer due and
payable.6o
In essence, creditors' enforcement rights were converted by the scheme
into rights to prove and to participate in the Pooled Fund.
This again indicates the legislative basis of the deed as it converts rights
from those pre-existing under the contract to a right to participate in the
returns under the deed. The development of these rights is surely founded
in the legislative provisions and not in the agreement between the parties.
56 Derwinto v Lewis [2002] NSWSC 731 [44].
57 Section 444D(I).
58 Sections 444D and 444F.
59 The exception being if the guarantee exempts the liability in the circumstances.
60 He/ou v Mu//igan Pty Limited [2003] NSWCA 92 [27] to [28].
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Lack of detail about tbe deed
The emphasis in the legislation on flexibility was argued as the basis for
Part S.3A not prescribing the matters that a deed must contain. As a result
the deed has been left to develop its own framework based upon the
ingenuity of the drafters. There are however some broad parameters as
well as a set of default provisions. This approach is a practical one but the
consequences of having inadequate coverage in the legislation dealing
with the deed can be illustrated by Dean Willcocks v ACG
EngineeringPty Ltd.61 In that case the company went into a deed of
company arrangement but the control of the company was placed with the
board. The administrator of the deed received an amount of money which
under the deed was to be distributed pro-rata amongst the deed creditors.
Before this could be done, the company became insolvent again and the
directors passed a resolution to that effect. Under the deed this
automatically placed the company in liquidation with the deed
administrator becoming the liquidator. The liquidator applied to the court
for directions as to what should be done with the funds received.
Specifically, the issue was whether the amounts should be held
exclusively for the deed creditors or whether it was an asset of the
company such $at- it should be distributed amongst all creditors, both
those who were creditors at the beginning of the voluntary administration
and those who became creditors later before the liquidation. Austin J held
in this case that the fund was held on trust because the terms of the deed
applied to deed creditors only and hence the post deed creditors were not
entitled to access. He said:
As a matter of the plain and natural meaning of the DCA [the) words seem
to me to create a trust of the amount of the Administration Fund held in the
Administration Account for the benefit of, inter alios, the Participating
Creditors identified in clause 5.5 (d). The trust' arises because clause 5.4(a)
imposes on the Deed Administrator an obligation to 'hold' the
Administration Fund in accordance with the terms of the DCA, and clause
5.5(d) requires that the balance after certain deductions be distributed pro
mta to the Participating Creditors. Where property is vested in a person
subject to a legally enforceable obligation to 'hold' that property so as to
make a distribution to someone else, the natural conclusion, under our law,
is that a trust of that property has been created. As I have said, I regard the
conclusion that there is a trust as a conclusion flowing from the wording of
the DCA. There is very little in the Corpomtions Act to assist in the
construction.62
61 Dean-WilIcocks v ACG Engineering [2003] NSWSC 353.
62 Dean-WilIcocks v ACG Engineering [2003] NSWSC 353 [15] to [16].
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The lack of assistance from the Act's wording is noteworthy of itself,
however the significant impact of this decision is that the wording in the
deed appears to be the detennining factor as to where the funds would go
when the company becomes insolvent when it is under a deed of
company arrangement.
Austin J distinguished this situation from an earlier decision of Santow J
in Re Spargold Enterprises Ply Ltd (subject to deed of company
arrangement); Ex parte McDonal(;(J3 where the duty was explained as
follows:
Drawing on the analogy of a voluntary liquidator, which I consider is
apposite also to a DCA administrator, a voluntary liquidator has a duty to act
impartially as between creditors...Such a voluntary liquidator is not a trustee
but is in a fiduciary position.64
Hence it was held in that case that the court could order the deed to be
tenninated because of the prospect of there being nothing left for post
deed creditors. Santow J was prepared to apply s 447E to such a case
stating that:
There is nothing in that subsection to suggest that the court would only
intervene where there is prejudice to pre-DCA creditors and would not
intervene where the prejudice is to post-DCA creditors. To the contrary, if as
appears 'creditors' include both categories, it would be surprising indeed
that the court has this statutory power to intervene by reason of prejudice
(here) to post-DCA creditors yet the administrator would have no duty of
impartiality towards them but rather a duty owed exclusively to pre-DCA
creditors; a duty leading the DCA administrator to distribute only to them,
leaving post-DCA creditors lamenting.65
The basis for not following Re Spargold was that there was no provision
in the deed in that situation that created a trust for the pre existing
creditors.66
There are a number of unfortunate consequences of the approach of the
court in the ACG Engineering case. First, it would follow that it is critical
that creditors covered by the deed examine the wording of the deed to
ensure that a trust has been created for the funds. This would protect them
to that extent in the event of a subsequent liquidation. Again this
63 (1999) 32 ACSR 363.
64 Re Spargold Enterprises Pty Ltd (subject to a deed of company arrangement); Ex
parte McDonald (1999) 32 ACSR 363 365.
65 Re Spargold Enterprises Pty Ltd (subject to a deed of company arrangement); Ex
parte McDonald (1999) 32 ACSR 363 364-5.
66 With respect to Austin J it is not entirely clear how his Honour knew this was correct
in the Spargold Enterprises case.
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emphasises the point made above as to the importance to creditors of
having the exact wording of the deed prior to approving it at the meeting
under s 439A. On the other hand a post deed creditor might need to
determine if it is wise to provide credit to the company in these
circumstances. From a policy perspective it may be questioned whether
the issue is not something to be covered in the legislation. This is because
a post deed creditor is at the mercy of the drafter of the deed in relation to
what assets may be available. It would be preferable if the uncertainty
were reduced if it is desired that creditors have confidence in the
company that is subject to the deed. In many cases a company will only
be able to continue in business with the support of creditors whose debts
come into existence after the deed is entered into. If the funds available to
these creditors may be reduced it will inhibit the major aim of Part 5.3A
to encourage the continuity of the business.
The approach of Austin J stems from, as he put it, a lack of assistance
from the legislation. The legislation fails to set out sufficiently how the
deed and the various stakeholders' rights are to operate once the company
is no longer in administration. A clearer statement of the application of
the principle laid down in s 447E would assist in this specific instance.
Setting aside the deed based on what was done in the voluntary
administration
It is necessary to look briefly at the basis on which the deed may be set
aside because the deed is drafted as part of the administration
procedure.67 Several of the grounds upon which the court may terminate
the deed are based upon actions taken during the voluntary administration
process. The basis of the setting aside of the deed under s 445D68
includes where 'there was misleading inforrpation or a material omission
in statements or reports to creditors';69 or 'the deed is oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against one or more
creditors or contrary to the interests of the creditors as a whole.'70
Each of these grounds is founded in the behaviour of the administrator
during the administration or the drafting of the deed that is done during
the administration. In addition, the court may void a deed based on a
67 This article does not cover detailed aspects of the operation of the deed of company
arrangement.
68 Specifically under s 445D (1)(a), (b), (c) and (t).
69 Ford, Austin, and Ramsay, Ford's Principles Of Corporations Law above n 13 [26
380].
70 This is covered in s 445D(1)(t).
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failure of the deed to have been entered into in 'accordance with this
Part' under s 445G.
The requirement for the creditors to be informed is fundamental to the
Part S.3A process.71 This ground was suggested by the Harmer Report as
a factor that goes 'to the heart of the effective operation of the
legislation'.72 The point to be made here is that a decision as to what
information is to be presented to creditors may impact on the survival of
the deed. Detailed consideration of the type of information and the
circumstances in which that information should be provided has been
given in a number of cases.73 These cases demonstrate that the courts are
willing to recognise the time limits imposed on administrators and the
need to report to creditors in a timely fashion.
As was pointed out by Austin J in DCT v Portinex,74 the Harmer'Report
did not suggest that the court be entitled to set aside the deed on the basis
of oppression or unfair prejudice. It was inserted by the legislature
without any statement as to the policy basis for it. This provision was
inserted in order to protect against the inappropriate use of the majority
power given that voting is not conducted by classes of creditors.75
The meaning of an oppressive or unfairly discriminatory deed was
discussed in Sydney Land Corp Pty Ltd v Kalon Pty Ltd.76 Young J held
that:
when one is looking at what is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial under
s 4450, one looks at it in the background ofthe general right of a creditor to
be paid or to wind the company up, or to have the company administered by
the administrator under the deed in a way which keeps the company's
business going and will see the creditor paid something out of the property
71 This is because the creditors must be infonned in order to make a proper decision.
72 Australian Law Refonn Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry AGPS, above n 7
[123].
73 See Hagenvale Pty Lld v Depela Pty Lld (1995) 17 ACSR 139; Deputy Commissioner
ofTaxation v Comcorp Australia Lld (1996) 21 ACSR 590; M & S Butler Investments
Pty Ltd v Granny May's Franchising Pty Ltd (1997) 24 ACSR 695; Deputy Federal
Commissioner of Taxation v Pddam Pty Ltd (1996) 14 ACLC 659; Velkovski v Ryan
(1996) 19 ACSR 514; Balhursl City Council v Event Management Specialist Pty Ltd
(admin apptd) (2001) 36 ACSR 732.
74 DCTv PortinexlSilindalelDalva/e [2000] NSWSC 99.
75 -The pragmatic approach to decision making that pervades the procedure is evident in
the manner that voting is structured as it is a simple majority and there are no classes.
In addition the remedy for disgruntled creditors is limited to applying to the court after
the decision is made and then only limited grounds: see s445D and ss600A-600C.
- 76 (1997) 26 ACSR 427 and approved of on appeal Kalon Pty Ltd v Sydney Land Corp
Pty Ltd [N02] (1998) 26 ACSR 593.
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of the company. If a scheme in a deed deviates from that, then the creditor is
more easily able to say that it is operating oppressively, than otherwise.77
It is difficult to see why the creditor is entitled to have the company
administered in a way that keeps the company going, as the objects of the
Part do not require that as such.78 Even if the continuity of the business
were the only justification for a deed, it is not apparent how this
necessarily relates to oppression or unfairly prejudicial conduct as it does
not imply unfairness. His Honour concluded by outlining the relevant
factors to take into account:
I then do have to consider, because all the authorities say that it is a relevant
matter, the comparable position of the plaintiff on a winding up, compared
with its position under the deed. I do not think, on the balance of
probabilities, that the plaintiff has shown that it is worse off under the
scheme than it would have been in a winding up. I think the evidence really
only goes to show that it is fairly close to line ball one way or the other. In
each case there are various imponderables. However, it seems to me that one
must add in other facts, namely
(a) that the plaintiff, and indeed the other creditors, are not likely to be better
offunder the deed;
(b) that there ts a'Collateral benefit to the shareholders in APH;
(c) that the plaintiff has to continue to have a commercial relationship with
people in whom it has no confidence;
(d) that the assets are shares and the subsidiaries are effectively removed
from the control ofthe administrator; and
(e) that the claim of the creditor is really not against the administrator any
more, but against APH direct,79
There are a number of matters that arise from this statement. One is that
the basis of the comparison with the winding up alternative has a sound
policy basis. It would be unfortunate if the only reason why the
comparison was made were because 'authorities say it is a relevant
matter'. It seems quite contradictory that the creditor had not shown that
it was worse off under the deed than under a winding up yet in paragraph
(a) it is said that the creditors are 'not likely to be better off under the
deed'. More importantly, the fact that there are collateral benefits to the
shareholders again does not explain why that makes the deed oppressive
77 (1997) 26 ACSR427, 430.
78 Rather s 435A states that if continuity of the company's business is not possible, it is
sufficient that there be a better return than that which would be available in an
immediate winding up.
79 (1997) 26 ACSR 427, 432.
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or unfairly prejudicial to the creditor. The basis of the Part 5.3A
procedure is to move away from the focus on selling up assets in a
winding up to give a conservative return. The simple statement that there
is a benefit to one stakeholder does not of itself imply oppression to
others. Again, the statements that claims cannot be made against the
administrator or that the assets are no longer under the control of the
administrator do not ofthemselves suggest unfairness as in any workout it
would be expected that assets be handed back. The legislation makes a
point of ending the administrator's liability for the debts incurred when
the voluntary administration ceases. The factors raised by Young J were
accepted by the Court of Appea1.8o .
Points of comparison when evaluating the deed:
The approval of the deed requires that the creditors evaluate it. The
obvious comparison is with the position in a winding up. This is what the
Act specifically requires in s 439A(4). However is it necessary to make
comparison not only with winding up but some other deed with different
provisions? The difficulty of this approach is obvious in that it would
seem possible to postulate an array of situations with which comparisons
would need to be drawn. Nevertheless this appears to be the approach in
some cases. In Khoury v'Zambena Pty Limited, Davies AJA proposes this
as appropriate:
The trial Judge agreed with the submission stating, 'if one analyses the
position under the deed and the position under a liquidation, the position of
the plaintiffs is not materially different; indeed, it may be that so far as the
order for costs is concerned, they obtain more under the deed than they
would in 'a liquidation.' However, this approach misses the point. The
creditors were not limited in their options to either approving the deed put
forward or voting for liquidation: see s 439C. It was the terms of the
particular scheme that prejudiced Capitol and Harry Sarkis and his family,
because its effect was to operate in a discriminatory manner upon those
debts. The interests of those creditors were prejudiced to an extent that was
unreasonable because the scheme discriminated. It was not fair to all
creditors. Had the related creditors been dealt with in a similar way in which
the debts due to Capitol, Harry Sarkis, his wife and his parents were dealt
with, then, although there may still have been prejudice because the scheme
would have precluded recovery of the debts, nevertheless, the prejudice
would not have been unreasonable. The scheme would then have applied
equally to creditors who voted in favour of the scheme, including the related
creditors, as it did to those who voted against the scheme.81
80 K%n Pty Lld v Sydney Land Corp Pty Lld [No2] (1998) 26 ACSR 593 at 598-599.
81 [1999] NSWCA 402 at [109] (Davies AJA).
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Also in the same case:
Secondly, the Court should not encourage the notion that 'anything goes'
provided only that that a deed of company arrangement provides some
benefit for dissatisfied creditors. Commonly, companies proposing deeds of
company arrangement are insolvent and what is proposed involves some
benefit for unsecured creditors. That cannot be permitted to be used by those
who promote such proposals as a critical factor which warrants the Court's
refusal to terminate or declare void such deeds, especially when different
groups ofunsecured creditors are treated differently.82
This position has also been taken by Austin J in DCT v Portinex:
The issue seems to be whether one or more creditors has been unfairly
prejudiced by the conduct, compared with the position they would have
been likely to occupy if the conduct had not occurred. The latter position
may have been that of creditors in a windin~ up, but it may be reasonable to
conclude on the facts that some other outcome would have been reached.83
The courts are justified in taking into account the various factors that may
have been relevant to the creditors' decision and where it is clear that
relevant matters were not revealed, to terminate the deed. However, it
seems difficult for the court to posit a number of other scenarios that may
have happened if another proposal was put forward. The estimation of the
returns from a winding up compared to those under the deed is part of the
fundamental reporting that the administrator undertakes. As explained
above, the legislation is vague as to how the deed is developed and
whether there is room for alternative proposals to be fully considered.
Therefore it will often be a speculative venture for a court to decide how
creditors may have voted or if their financial position may have been
'better' if another avenue was taken. Such speculation is inappropriate in
a procedure designed to be voluntary and based upon a majority of
creditors deciding the fate of their claims against the company.
Legal issues relating to the transition to winding up
As part of the Harmer Report recommendations84 the legislation provides
for the ready transition to winding up through Division 12 of Part S.3A.
The conversion to a winding up may result from a decision of the meeting
of creditors under s 439A.85 It may also result without the intention of the
82 Khoury v Zambena Pry Limited [1999] NSWCA 402 [80] (Fitzgerald JA).
83 DCTv PortinexlSilindalelDalvale (2000) 34 ACSR 391; [2000] NSWSC 99.
84 Australian Law Refonn Commission Report No. 45 General Insolvency Inquiry
AGPS, 1988, at para [56].
85 Also by way of a meeting under s 445F where creditors resolve to terminate the deed
as a result ofa meeting called to consider a variation to the deed or tennination of it.
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creditors being manifested in that way.86 However where a winding up
was already in place prior to the winding up, this choice is not available
to the creditors.87
One fundamental issue arising is the nature of the winding up resulting
from s 446A. Clearly the winding up is one always connected to the
voluntary administration. But how far should this go? In Gibbons v
Liberty One Lld (in liq) Austin J suggested that:
It is noticeable that s 446A does not adopt the regime for creditors'
voluntary winding up in an absolute or unrestricted fashion ...the winding up
emerging from the application of s 446A is made to fit into the·creditors'
voluntary winding up regime only by the operation of deeming
provisions...the deeming provisions... 'borrow' Part 5.5 and adapt it to
circumstances arising out ofa voluntary administration.88
In Re One-Tel, it would seem that the approach was taken one step
further when Barrett J made the following comment:
The species ofwinding up brought about by s 446A may thus be regarded as
a product of that section itself, rather than of the events which cause the
provisions with respect to creditors' voluntary winding up to apply and
operate of their own force.. all those steps are lacking and, to the extent that
their existence is integral to the initiation and conduct of the system of
insolvent administration disregarded creditors' voluntary winding up, they
are either dispensed with altogether or in some way deemed to exist.89
By causing s 482 to apply (albeit in a modified way) in relation to the
winding up as if it were a winding up by the court, s 446A imports its
own method of effecting a stay or termination of the winding up, being a
method that is not available in relation to a creditors' voluntary winding
up brought about by the steps with which s 446A dispenses. Once
activated, s 446A becomes the source of a winding up regime different
from the regime that comes to apply by the taking of the steps dispensed
with. One may therefore properly regard s 446A as having an ongoing
and sustaining operation for the duration of the winding up regime it has
created. It is not, as it were, exhausted and spent once the winding up
regime is in place.
86 This may be a result of the company's failure to execute a deed within the required
period (s 446A(I)(b) or from the operation ofreg 5.3A.07 for example where the court
terminates a deed under s 445D: s 446B(l).
87 See above n 20
88 [2002] NSWSC 274
89 [2002] NSWSC 1081 {need pinpoint}
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The reliance placed upon s 482 here as being an indication that the
winding up to be differentiated from creditors' voluntary winding up is,
with respect, arguable. It would appear that s 482 is generally seen as
being applicable in a voluntary winding up because of s 511(1).90
Therefore it seems difficult to see the relevance of the reference to s 482
in s 446A to the argument that the section creates its own winding up.
The implication of the case law is that there is now a third type of
winding up. There is winding up by the court, voluntary winding up as
effected through Part 5.5, and winding up as a result of s 446A. It is not
entirely clear that the intention to create a third means of winding up was
what the legislature envisaged when Part 5.3A was introduced.91 But in
addition there are practical implications. Specifically, because of the
ongoing impact of s 446A,92 s 447A may be utilised in a winding up that
is the outcome of a voluntary administration. For example in Gibbons v
LibertyOne Lld (in liq)93 the liquidator applied for relief from the
requirement to hold a meeting under s 508. The application centred upon
the issue as to whether s 447A could be applied.94 In the course of the
judgment, Austin J stated that it was:
[c]ontended s 447A cannot be used to implement a regime different from
the regime contemplated by another part of the Corporations Act, in this
case the regime for a creditors' voluntary administration under Part 5.5 [it
was] submitted that to modifY the operation of s 508 (1) (b) would be to
give s 447A an operation going beyond Part 5.3A, and operation offensive
to the specific imperative of s 508 (1 ) (b). He said that s 508 is a mandatory
90 See Keay, McPherson The Law o/Company Liquidation (4th ed 1999) 661 where it is
stated that 'There can be no doubt that s 482 of the Corporations Law applies to
voluntary winding up, as well as compulsory winding up' This was based upon the
cases cited therein as well as the wording of the section which states that it may be
applied at any time during the winding up of the company as well as the fact that the
section is under the heading the general powers of the court in Division 3 ofPart 5.4B
91 There is little in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Re/orm Bill
1992 that indicates the nature of the winding up but it does deal with transition to
winding up, see para 772. In addition the discussion above regarding the Harmer
Report indicated that a court ordered winding up was envisaged.
92 See the comments ofBarrett J in Re One.Tel Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1081 at [56]
93 [2002] NSWSC 274; see also Re Walker & anor [2002] NSWSC 705 at [19]; re Lave
(as liquidator 0/ ACN 077 368 257 Limited) [2003] NSWSC 58 and re Love (as
liquidator of ACN 077 368 257 Limited) [2003] NSWSC 149
94 This utilisation of s 447A whilst the company is being wound up may take its
operation further than is suggested by some of the statements in Australasian Memory
Ply Ltd v Brien [2000] HCA 30. There the court emphasised the relation back to the
administration but added that the ability to reinstate an administration may have ended
once the company enters into liquidation (see [28]). It is one thing to have the
rectification of a liquidation where the parties had proceeded on that basis it is taking
the legislation further to apply s 447A to alter how the liquidation may operate
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provision in specific tenns, which should not be supplemented or qualified
by a general provision such as s 447A. He relied upon the principle in David
Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR
265.95
These submissions misconceive the nature of the plaintiffs application.
The plaintiff does not seek to modify a mandatory statutory provision
applicable to a creditors' voluntary winding up. Rather, the plaintiff seeks
to qualify the extent to which a deeming provision of Part 5.3A operates,
in circumstances where the winding up falls within Part 5.5 not because a
creditors' voluntary winding up has been selected in the nor.rnal fashion,
but because the creditors have taken a decision of another kind in the
c(.mtext of voluntary administration.
The outcome of this way of viewing the liquidation arising from a
voluntary administration creates the possibility of parties utilising the
procedure for the purposes of gaining a more flexible liquidation. If a
company in insolvent circumstances were considering a creditors'
voluntary liquidation it may well be advised to proceed with a voluntary
administration because of the ability to use s 447A. Such flexibility as s
447A produces is not evident in Part 5.5.
Analysing outcomes·Irom a theoretical perspective
One of the elements lacking in the literature on Australian insolvency law
is a strong theoretical framework within which to evaluate the law.96
'Whilst other theory may be used to evaluate insolvency legislation, one
model that has been used extensively in the United States is the
economics ~d .law approach. It is interesting to place the Australian
legislation under the scrutiny of this approach as it differs to the
American approach to corporate rescue in many ways. The nature of the
formulation of a deed (or plan) has been analysed extensively in the law
and economics literature in the United States. Roe has suggested that
Three ... mechanisms [can] ...accomplish a colporate reorganisation:
(1) a bargain among creditors and stockholders;
(2) litigation in which the court imposes an administered solution and
capital structure; and
95 Gibbons v LibertyOne Lld (in fiq) [2002] NSWSC 274 at [47] -[49].
96 There have been some exceptions to this but for the most part there is little debate from
within any particular theoretical model. Rather the debate tends to proceed either
without considering any framework or on broad contradictory aims that are not useful
as a means of evaluation and focuses in on technical issues.
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(3) use of the market.97
The approach favoured by most in the economics and law literature is the
use of the market. By this they generally encompass some fonn of auction
or sale of the finn as a going concern at the time of insolvency.98The
argument is based on the concept that a finn's assets are properly valued
by the market and that this return should be paid out to the creditors to
recover their funds. In certain circumstances that will be possible under
the Australian provisions as they allow for the administrator to dispose of
the whole or part of the company's business.99 However, if that were the
only option for the administrator without any other limitation, the sale
that would take place will have to consider the power of creditors or
others to apply for the winding up. 100 A lack of infonnation about many
smaller finns raises doubts as to whether they could be properly valued in
a market anyway. The sale in these circumstances is likley to be
strategically manipulated by various stakeholders even though that is
what the advocates of the system seek to avoid. lol The costs of holding a
sale in these circumstances might also be considerablel02 and, whilst there
is no way of judging if the costs are lower in the current managed
procedure as in Australia, there is no evidence that they are higher
either.103
97 M Roe, Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials
(2000) 579.
98 For example D Baird, 'The Uneasy Case for Corporate reorganization' (1986) 15
Journal of Legal Studies 127; L Bebchuck, 'A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations' (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 775; M Roe, Corporate
Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (2000) 578; B Adler
B, 'Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation' (1992) 77 Cornel/ Law Review 439.
99 Section 437A and Brash Holdings Ltdv Shaftr (1994) 12 ACLC 619.
100 Some parties may achieve as much in the immediate winding up as they do from the
restructure so that they will have little incentive to allow a reorganisation: see M
White, 'The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision' in J Bhandari and L Weiss (eds),
Corporate Bankruptcy- Economic and Legal Perspectives (1996) 207.
101 This could be done through matters such as timing extent of advertising and grouping
of assets to be sold etc.
102 It has been estimated that the direct costs of bankruptcy in the United States are about
3% of the firm's assets: see L Weiss, 'Direct costs and violation of priority of claims
in J Bhandari and L Weiss (eds), Corporate Bankruptcy- Economic and Legal
Perspectives (1996) 260. There are no corresponding figures in Australia that the
author is aware of.
103 F Easterbrook, 'Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?' in J Bhandari and L Weiss (eds),
Corporate bankruptcy- Economic and legal perspectives (1996) at 408. This article
presents a strong intuitive argument that the costs of the auction may be higher than the
current US system in Chapter 11.
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What is the means ofachieving reorganisation in Part S.3A?
The legislation in the United States is seen as having a period of
bargaining followed by a court imposed reorganisation. The Australian
system can be seen in this context as really one of bargain amongst the
creditors. In general, because the legislation allows the drafting of a deed
with few limitations, the creditors as a group may be seen to be in a
position to bargain as they might do without legislation as regards matters
such as the role of the administrator in a deed, as well as their return
compared to other creditors. The lack oflegislation governing the deed's
operation was contrasted above with the voluntary administration which
is more closely regulated by the Corporations Act.104 This is reflective
then of a negotiated solution to the company's insolvency that is agreed
by the parties affected; for example, in relation to the role of the
administrator under the deed. The role here can be one that involves day
to day control of the company or it could simply be one of checking that
the deed is complied with and day to day running of the company
returned to the directors. The creditors can evaluate the risk of
insufficient supervision and the attendent costs with the out of pocket
costs of greater control by the independent administrator.
However, this analysis must be limited somewhat by the practical realities
of the detailed legislation. The unsecured creditors are, because of the
voting method, bound by majority votes or perhaps by the casting vote of
the administrator when a meeting is held under s 439A. The courts may
see that the nature of the deed is contractual but the bottom line is that all
unsecured creditors are bound by the deed even if they did not agree to it.
In addition, the procedure of the development of the deed is such that
there is a short time period for the deed to be negotiated. The legislation
lacks clarity as to who should have input into the formulating the deed.
Thus the liklihood is that the deed may be essentially created by the
administrator albeit with the consideration that it must be passed at the
second creditors' meeting.
Influence of management in the Australian procedure
The Australian procedure does overcome the bias towards management
and shareholders that is found in some other jurisdictions. The basis of
much criticism of the Chapter 11 procedure in the United States rests on
the power of the management. 105 This was explained by WhitelO6 as being
based upon such matters as:
104 For example in Division 3 setting out the powers of the administrator.
105 Perhaps in coalition with last minute fmanciers and shareholders.
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• the exclusive right to propose a plan during the first six months;
• the threat to transfer a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 11 to a
liquidation where the returns to unsecured creditors are likely to be
diminished;
• the debtor in possession basis for the Chapter 11 procedure so that
the management has control of the assets of the company during the
period; and
• the focus of management on the procedure can be contrasted with the
diverse interests of the creditors who may lack the incentive to form
interest groups.
In the Australian system, a number of these aspects are not present. The
management does not control the corporation during the administration.
There is no exclusivity on the proposal for a deed and the administrator
should be the real controller of the situation. So what are the incentives
in the Australian procedure on this type of analysis? It would seem likely
that the role of the administrator and other aspects of the deed are perhaps
going to foremost reflect the interest of the administrator as he or she has
the greatest degree of control. This raises the important facet of the
Australian voluntary administration regime that the administrator's
interests must reflect those of the creditors.
Should the court set aside a deed on the basis of comparison with
other scenarios?
In analysing when the courts have set aside deeds on the basis of unfair
prejudice, one argument has been that it is not enough to say that the
return is better than under a winding up. This argument, that the deed as
presented to creditors should not be considered the only option to
compare with winding up, demonstrates the difficulty when the criteria
for judging a proper deed becomes vague and unclear. Much of the
concern of the courts seems to be that there is imbalance in the return to
various groups of creditors who would in a winding up rank pro rata. The
pro rata return to creditors in winding up (which is also described as the
pari passu principle) has been explained as the 'most fundamental
principle of insolvency law' .107 However the treatment of the principle in
the context of a corporate rescue procedure is open to question.108 Goode
argues that:
106 White, 'The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision' above n 99 218.
107 R M Goode, Principles ofCorporate Insolvency Law (1997) 14).
108 The principle was rejected by the CASAC Report as being relevant to a deed of
company arrangement: see Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities
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Since the pari passu principle is concerned to ensure an equitable
distribution of the company's estate among its creditors, it is confined to
liquidation, for that is the only collective insolvency process which involves
the distribution of assets among the general body of creditors.I09
The economic basis for ignoring the pari passu principle lies in the nature
of the deed itself. The question that the courts need to ask is whether the
deed can make some creditors better off without making the other
creditors worse off. The focus in the procedure needs to be on improving
the return to creditors but this does not exclude the possibility of
improving returns to other stakeholdersllo at the same time. A successful
corporate rescue suggests that the benefits are likely to be gained by the
shareholders or management group as well as the creditors. The issue of
who gains the most from any surplus of rescue over winding up is one
that is better left to the negotiation of the parties. The fact that some
creditors may receive less than others does not of itself justify
interference in the distribution of any reorganisation surplus.
Wbat is the position of secured creditors and owners of property?
The interests of the secured creditors and the owners or lessors of
property should also be accurately considered in the deed as they have the
option of staying outside of it. 111 They will only be bound to terms that
they specifically agree to. As was indicated above their position is
diminished to the extent that the administration is prolonged but the
Australian procedure is much shorter than the open ended North
American models. Their position is much stronger than most of the
unsecured creditors. This is consistent with a contractual basis for the
deed and in this sense it will represent a negotiated outcome.
Information about tbe content of tbe deed
The development of a deed that reflects creditors' wishes will depend to
some extent on the skill of the administrator. Information assymetry is an
important reason for the appointment of an administrator and therefore
the need to provide information to the creditors is fundamental. A starting
point for this is for the administrator to provide adequate information
abo~t the company's position and its prospects.The basis of any decision
by the creditors though must be information about the terms of the deed
Advisory Committee, Corporate Voluntary Administration Final Report (1998) [5.38]
to [5.45].
109 Goode, Principles o/Corporate Insolvency Law above n 106 143.
110 Such as shareholders.
I11 Subject to any court order under s 444F.
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itself. Therefore, the fact that there is little in the Act that compels the
deed to be available before the meeting of creditors is a failure to ensure
the integrity of the procedure. What the economic model suggests is that
the creditors will agree to be bound to a deed that allows for improved
returns over liquidation and they will have confidence that the plan is
valid because of the independence of the administrator. Creditors may of
course trust the administrator to develop a deed that reflects their wishes
because of the administrator's independence and professional standing.
However, as noted above, the criticism of this aspect of the procedure
shows that some change to the legislation may assist in engendering
confidence in the procedure plus improve the decision making of the
creditors.
The implication ofthe winding up alternative
The ability to move from voluntary administration to liquidation was
considered in the Harmer Report to be an important improvement in our
insolvency legislation. Generally it is apparent that the ability of creditors
to select liquidation as an option at the meeting delivers a powerful
incentive for management and other related stakeholders to develop a
deed that provides~benefits to at least the majority of creditors. Further,
the option of liquidation enables a quick resolution of the insolvency if a
deed is not supported.
It was recommended that creditors' voluntary liquidation procedures be
abandoned. 1I2 This was not adopted but subsequently the CASAC Report
again recommended that it be removed.113 There are sound policy reasons
for doing so. It was shown above how the courts have come to recognise
a liquidation that follows a winding up as being a different type of
liquidation and it is not a case of applying the provisions of the creditors'
voluntary winding up in total. The existence of the three types of winding
up for an insolvent corporation in the legislation creates an opportunity
for strategic behaviour by stakeholders. Reducing the opportunity to
engage in this behaviour is beneficial to all because it will reduce the
112 Australian Law Refonn Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry AGPS, above n
7[57].
113 Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate
Voluntary Administration Final Report (1998) [8.70] to [8.78]. Note however that this
was rejected by a parliamentary committee see, Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, Corporate Insolvency
Laws: a Stocktake (2004).
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costs of borrowing. I14 Some of the arguments against the abolition of the
creditors' voluntary winding up rest on the assumed greater costs
associated with the voluntary administration.1I5 However, it is by no
means certain that the voluntary administration followed by a liquidation
is a more expensive option then the current voluntary liquidation
procedure where the company is insolvent. There is no data on the
relative costs of the various procedures and an intuitive argument may be
made that the voluntary administration does not add to the costs of a
liquidation.
Conclusions
This article has examined the outcomes of the voluntary administration
process, not to provide a detailed commentary on all of the matters
relevant to the options available, but to analyse how this impacts upon the
voluntary administration process itself. The voluntary administration
procedure is limited and shaped by the nature of the results or outcomes
that flow from it. It has been shown that not all of the Harmer Report's
suggestions were taken up by the legislation in the area of winding up in
particular.
The legislation has proceeded on the basis that there should be minimal
control by way of direction with respect to deeds of company
arrangement. The basis of this being that the creditors should be left to
respond to particular circumstances in the manner appropriate to achieve
the best outcome. This has resulted in a general lack of clarity about the
nature of the deed of company arrangement and how it should operate. It
has been left to the courts to fill in what is required and what should be
the parameters of the procedure. Given the anticipated law reform in the
area of corporate insolvency this is one area that is in need of review.
Areas such as who develops the deed, what comparisons need to be made
by the administrator when making his or her report and what powers exist
in relation to not assenting to the deed are all matters that have been left
unclear in the legislation. As the above argument suggests these could be
. covered in the legislation to improve its effectiveness. Specifically it was
also questioned as to whether the priority of creditors under a deed over
_those who become creditors after the deed is entered into should be
114 For an analysis of the costs of having multiple enforcement procedures see D Baird,
'Loss distribution, forum shopping and bankruptcy: A reply to Warren' (1987) 54
University o/Chicago Law Review 815.
115 See the discussion in the CASAC Report Legal Committee of the Companies and
Securities Advisory Committee Corporate Voluntary Administration Final Report
June 1998 at para 8.73.
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determined by the words of the deed itself. This is something better dealt
with by the legislation given the importance of encouraging creditors to
support a company that is subject to a deed of company arrangement. The
development of the case law goes some way to clarifying the law but has
not provided an effective solution. It would be preferable if the legislation
stated that creditors whose debts arise after the deed was entered into be
given equal claim on the available assets in the event of a liquidation and
that it not depend upon particular wording in the deed itself.
The powers that the court has in relation to setting aside the deed will
impact on the development of it in the voluntary administration and it was
shown that not all of the approaches by the courts are consistent with the
aims of the legislation in this regard.
Generally the procedure does provide some opportunity for creditors to
negotiate a reorganisation in the light of the insolvency of the firm. In this
respect it goes some way to being consistent with economic theory. It is
in this respect an improvement over the North American model. It does
not meet the demand of some theorists though who argue that the
procedure be based on direct sale or offer of the firm as a going concern
in order to justify any deviation from liquidation processes. This article
has shown some gaps in the procedure which could be eliminated thus
making the achievement of the objectives in Part S.3A more likely as a
result of the voluntary administration procedure. As a result of the
report116 by the Joint Parliamentary Committeee on Corporations and
Financial Services there may be some legislative changes in the near
future in the area of corporate insolvency and this is one aspect that may
be reviewed.
116 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate
Insolvency Laws: a Stocktake above n 112.
